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Abstract: In this paper, I show how contemporary feminist artists whose works
concern femicides address three senses of the term ‘to disappear’. These works can
be particularly disturbing, along the lines of Danto’s notion of disturbatory art,
since these kinds of works use artistic means to unveil the social and subjective
implications of gender crimes.
When something disappears it stops being visible, so it is either lost (and
never found) or it just ceases to exist. However, when someone disappears
in the first sense, the person does not simply go missing as if he or she has
vanished off the face of the earth. Rather, when a person goes missing there is
always someone else who is trying to find him or her, and even if the person
is never found, there is always the hope that the person is alive, though
in some unknown place. For that reason the status of a missing person is
neither dead nor alive. When someone disappears in the second sense, the
deceased person’s disappearance can usually be explained by reasons such
as natural causes, accidents, or because the person was killed. Nevertheless,
if to disappear means to stop being visible, then there is another sense of
the term, that is, to be absent from certain kinds of representations that are
used to give someone or something visibility, so when someone or something
ceases to be visible in those representations, the person or thing passes out
of sight. In this paper, I will show how contemporary feminist artists whose
works concern femicides address all three senses of the term ‘to disappear’.
These works can be particularly disturbing, along the lines of Danto’s notion
c© Aesthetic Investigations Vol 2, No 1 (2018), 94-103
Gemma Argüello Manresa PhD
of disturbatory art, since these kinds of works use artistic means to unveil the
social and subjective implications of gender crimes.
Arthur Danto used the term disturbatory art to describe a kind of art that
is intended ‘to modify, through experiencing it, the mentality of those who
experience it.’1 And the ‘point and purpose’ of this kind of art ‘is to make
vivid and objective our most frightening subjective thoughts.’2 For Danto,
we can find cases of disturbatory art in performance and feminist art because
artistic means are used as vehicles to produce an effect in the viewers that can
prompt moral and social change. Then, if disturbatory art uses artistic means
to intentionally modify the viewer’s thoughts, it is intended to have a specific
function that goes beyond the aesthetic and artistic fields. Danto’s description
of disturbatory art shares features in common with participatory art, since
participatory art also intends to produce certain effects in the viewers in order
to change their points of view and, in some cases, affects the context in which
they live. However, participatory art is not necessarily disturbing. Danto
argues that his concept of disturbation ‘is derived from its natural English
rhyme, where images have physical consequences—fantasies are transformed
into orgasms and hence into feelings of release and peace (when not infected
by guilt).’3 For that reason, when he discusses feminist art he argues that it
is ‘funky, aggressive, confrontational, flagrant, shocking, daring, extreme and
meant to be sensed as dangerous’ using ‘nudity, blood, menstrual fluids and
the like almost magically, as if seeking to connect the artists with the earliest
forms of artistic magic as practiced by shamans and wonder-workers and
personages possessed by higher powers’.4 As long as disturbation for Danto
leads to ‘feelings of release and peace’ using what is ‘ugly, disordered, distorted
and offensive’, it seems that his definition is inspired by the psychoanalytic
interpretation of the concept of catharsis, such as Julia Kristeva proposes in
her analysis of the abject.5 However, Kristeva’s notion of the abject confronts
the reality of our body wastes, the women’s fluids, repressed by the symbolic
order, that are released, purified, through religion and the artistic experience,
yet still keep their sense as something ‘dangerous’.6
In contrast, when Danto describes disturbation as a state that is ‘not
infected by guilt’, it seems he distances his conception from psychoanalytic
approaches like Kristeva’s that is based in both the construction of a sense
of guilt and the subject’s unconscious processes of repression and sublima-
tion. However, Danto’s definition lacks an explanation of how the catharsis,
or transformation of the disturbatory into ‘feelings of release and peace’, is
produced. If there is such a catharsis, it is necessary to explain which proper-
ties the ‘disturbatory’ requires in order to produce its particular effect on the
viewer. It is also necessary to give the sufficient conditions for something to
be disturbing, in contrast of something that it is horrific, threatening, danger-
ous, distressful, etc. And finally, if something disturbing produces catharsis,
what makes that experience different from the experience of the tragic, the
horror, the suspense, and so on? For that reason it is preferable to use a
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minimal definition of disturbatory art. Danto alluded to this definition later,
when he discussed the difference between the Abu Ghraib photographs of
torture infringed by the US Army and C.I.A. personnel upon prisoners un-
der their watch and Botero’s painting series that appropriate those photos.
Danto maintains that ‘Botero’s paintings establish a visceral sense of identi-
fication with the victims, whose suffering we are compelled to internalize and
make vicariously our own.’7 By referencing Botero, he shares the idea that ‘a
painter can do things a photographer can’t do, because a painter can make
the invisible visible.’8 For Danto, Botero’s paintings ‘call up the feelings of a
Baroque evocation of martyrdom’ and in contrast with Picasso’s Guernica,
these paintings are not about an ‘incidental horror of war’ we should know in
order to get its meaning, but they refer to a ‘world event’ that ‘immerse us in
the experience of suffering.’9 Danto’s claim about which events deserve to be
worldly and historically meaningful and which do not is clearly disputable.
However, Danto’s suggestion that something disturbatory in the arts ‘makes
the invisible visible’ is worthy of notice. The disturbatory artwork is able
to ‘make the invisible visible’ as long as it can extend its meaning beyond
the mere report of an event in order to engage the viewers and let them feel
something for the depicted victims’ experiences.
Consequently, a disturbatory artwork refers to the suffering of the vic-
tims of violence. However, even if the horrors of war prevail as disturbatory
art’s main leitmotif, disturbatory art could include other forms of violence.
If we don’t constrain it to political violence, it could include other types of
violence and experiences of affliction, trauma, suffering and pain. Then, the
disturbatory artwork shows shocking situations that carry pain, violence, hu-
miliation, injustice and torment of others or ourselves, and those situations
offend our moral feelings and values, that means, they produce moral disgust
and indignation. Moreover, if we follow Danto, disturbatory art is intended
‘to modify the consciousness and even change the lives of its “viewers”.’10 It
thus seems that it is committed to producing certain reactions in the viewer
that may lead to social, political or even moral change. If this is the case,
disturbatory artworks show shocking situations that deserve to be addressed
in order ‘to modify the consciousness’ or ‘change the lives’ of the audience.
However, it is clearly disputable to assert that the artwork per se is able to
modify the consciousness of anyone, but not that it can affect the audiences’
mental states, by letting them entertain different beliefs, feel various emo-
tions or even think about the context in which they live. Therefore, even if
the disturbatory artwork cannot modify any consciousness, it is intended to
produce certain effects that are elicited by the shocking situations shown by
different artistic means. Those situations are the result of violations produced
by the human agency, and as long as those situations are related to different
experiences of suffering, the artwork shows them publicly, as if they deserve
to be denounced.
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However, the disturbatory artwork does not simply denounce and report
a tragic event but, by ‘making the invisible visible’, it is able to engage the
viewers in the experiences of suffering depicted instead of merely letting them
know what happened. The disturbatory artwork shows shocking situations
that elicit moral disgust and indignation to acts produced by the human
agency in order to affect what the viewers think about the situation shown,
as well as to move the viewer to empathize and sympathize with the points
of views of the victims’ experiences. The way the artwork shows those points
of view depends on how much the artists are involved in the situation shown.
For this reason, I next distinguish two kinds of disturbatory artworks:
(1) Artworks that show the pain, violence, humiliation, injustice and torment
that people have suffered as a result of specific social, moral and political
conditions that the artist has not suffered directly.
(2) Artworks that show the pain, violence, humiliation, injustice and torment
that people have suffered as a result of specific social, moral and political
conditions that the artist has suffered directly as an individual or as member
of a community that has been affected.
Botero’s paintings are an example of (1), as are Joan Fontcuberta’sGoogle-
grames, a series of photomosaics he created using a program that selected in-
formation from the Google web search engine according to criteria established
by the user. For example, for the Abu Ghraib photomosaic Googlegram 05
(2005) ‘the search engine was given the names of top officials, civilian contrac-
tors and enlisted soldiers cited in the “Final Report of the Independent Panel
to Review DoD detention Operations” (August 2004) of the Schlesinger Panel,
set up by the United States Congress to investigate the alleged abuses.’11
Many feminist artworks are an example of (2), because feminist artists
are committed to challenge and expose the conditions they suffer as females,
individually and collectively. In this regard, many feminist artists have shown
how women have been absent or how different dimensions of being a woman
have disappeared from the symbolic representations in the media and the
arts. And recently, disturbatory feminist art shows the commitment artists
have for denouncing violence against females, specifically femicides, by using
different artistic means.12
Femicides are not publicly recognised as gender crimes in many counties,
and few admit that they are produced by the social structures and the in-
stitutions that have not taken the necessary measures to stop them and to
prosecute the killers. For that reason, artists have been committed to show
that femicides are gender-based hate crimes committed against females, and
they have used different artistic means in order to show how these crimes
should produce moral disgust and indignation in the audiences because they
are violent, they are not publicly recognised nor prosecuted and they produce
too much pain and suffering to the victims and their families. Specifically,
Mexican and Latin American artists have played an important role in ad-
dressing femicides through performances, public interventions, photography,
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installations, dance, theater and painting. They have shown publicly how
females are disappearing as a result of the neglect of their subjectivity and
autonomy, the obliteration of their bodies, and the silencing of their voices
by the killers and the authorities, and, in consequence, the impossibility of
giving the testimony about their own suffering. For example, the Mexican
artist Lorena Wolffer has done different performances and art interventions
in public spaces in order to denounce the violence against females in Mex-
ico, the Mexican government’s corruption and the remaining impunity for
the perpetrators of femicides. For the performance Mientras dormíamos (El
paso Juarez) (While we were sleeping (The case of Juarez), 2002, 2003, 2004),
Wolffer describes her action as follows:
Based on police reports, I used my body as a symbolic map to
document and narrate violence in fifty registered cases . Presented in a
morgue-like atmosphere, the work consisted in reproducing on my own
body with a surgical pen every beat, cut and gunshot those women
suffered. In this way my body changed into a representation vehicle of
the violence against women in Ciudad Juárez, that nowadays seems
institutionalized.13
During the performance, people heard descriptions of the tortures suf-
fered by the women in each case. At the end, Wolffer’s entire body had the
marks of the femicides. Another artist that has addressed femicides is the
Guatemalan performance artist Regina José Galindo. Galindo’s work is mo-
tivated by the brutality of the massacres produced during the Guatemalan
Civil War, the violence and normalised fear experienced by people living in
Guatemala, the death of females and other topics regarding violence against
females. In the performance Perra (‘Bitch’, 2005) at the Promote Gallery di
Ida Pisani in Milano, Galindo carved the word ‘perra’ (‘bitch’) into her right
leg with a knife. In this performance, she wanted to denounce femicides in
Guatemala where the females’ bodies are tortured and marked with knives or
razors. With these performances Wolffer and Galindo not only make visible
hundreds of females, otherwise invisible in the media, who have been assas-
sinated or have completely disappeared in Mexico and Guatemala, but they
also establish a performance-testimony for those silenced females, leaving au-
diences to infer how much those females suffered, as well as to sympathize
with their suffering.
Finally, in contrast to Danto, who argues that photography cannot be
used as a means to ‘make the invisible visible’, artists like the Mexicans
Mayra Martell and Maya Goded have used photography to demonstrate how
those who go missing can rather be represented as meaningful absences, as
a presence that is derived from the objects kept by her families and the
representation of their suffering. Their photographs show the pain of the
families whose daughters, sisters, cousins, nieces and granddaughters have
disappeared, without leaving any trace of where they have gone, where their
98
Gemma Argüello Manresa PhD
bodies were disposed of, if they are dead or who took their bodies away. But
they also show how those females are still present in the memory of those
who are still looking for them. In the series Ensayo sobre la Identidad (Iden-
tity Essay) (2005-2011), Mayra Martell took photos of the way people keep
alive their memories of their female relatives disappeared in Ciudad Juárez.
In her statement about this series she sustains that her ‘primary intention
was to validate the disappearance of woman, not to validate numbers’, and
she ‘wanted to see their rooms almost as an intuitive movement, as a past
necessity’.14 Martell’s photographs show how families keep intact the rooms
of their disappeared female family members, treasure family albums, still dis-
play their clothes over the bed as if they still lived there and hang religious
images with photos of the disappeared females, which show that the fami-
lies’ hopes and faith are still intact. One photograph captures the missing
woman’s portrait with the label ‘desaparecida’ (‘disappeared’), her name and
the date of her disappearance hanging underneath another portrait of the
same woman without any labels, which represents the tension families endure
to keep memories of their loved ones alive and the suffering the constant re-
minder that they are still missing, meanwhile as any family they try to go on
with their lives.
For the series Desaparecidas (Disappeared Women) (2006) Maya Goded
took in Ciudad Juárez a series of photographs in which she depicted a mother
crying sitting next to the portrait of her missing daughter, a family seated in
the living room as if they were waiting, the desert where many female bodies
have been found, the pink crosses put in the desert that have been used as
public symbols that commemorate the victims, an image of a street graffiti
saying ‘te esperamos’ (‘we are waiting for you’), a photo that depicts portraits
of a lost female displayed on the wall of her family home, among other situa-
tions that represent the absence. Since 2015, Goded has complemented that
series with two video installations about girls who live in violent neighbour-
hoods that are sisters or daughters of missing females. Both Maya Goded and
Mayra Martell sacrifice the supposed realism that photojournalism intends to
achieve. In their photographs, they rather show how the disappearance of a
female causes damages that go beyond being ‘neither dead nor alive’ since
those females have social and group affiliations and affinities that shape their
existence (even just as a memory) and give their absence greater meaning.
Those women who have disappeared, those who might have been murdered
but their bodies have yet to be found, and those women whose bodies have
been found but whose suffering was completely silenced are portrayed in these
series through their absence. Contrary to photography that usually depicts
violent situations or that intends to show the massacres as if they were eye-
witness reports (like war-photography, social documentary photography or
yellow journalism), the absence of the females in the situations portrayed en-
tails their existence as females with a name, a history, a family, with certain
racial features and members of a socio-economic class, most of them being
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poor. These photographs do not show the photographed subject, because
the female cannot be depicted, she is disappeared from the representation.
Since they do merely show portraits hanging on a wall, beds, a landscape or
a woman crying, these photographs are appreciated as long as it is impossi-
ble to take the photograph of the subject. Her existence is derived from the
way the photographers capture the different objects the female possessed, her
mother’s face, the place where her body might be or found, and photographs
of her portraits taken to emphasize her absence showing the value portraits
have as a testimony of their existence for the female’s families and the soci-
ety. These photographs do not merely show ‘what human beings are capable
of doing—may volunteer to do, enthusiastically, self-righteously’.15 And the
role memory plays in these images goes beyond the fact that ‘remembering is
an ethical fact’ that let us have a greater understanding of life and death.16
The absences portrayed in these photographs let us also recognise how the
invisible can be visible by inferring from the objects depicted the importance
the presence of someone has for the other, and the suffering anyone can feel
if someone close to her disappears.
These artworks are disturbatory as long as they let the audience take
the victim’s and her family’s point of view. However, because they are dis-
turbatory, they arouse moral disgust, an emotion that, according to Martha
Nussbaum, is directed to ourselves in virtue of our revulsion to different ob-
jects that may contaminate us and remind us of our mortality and animality.17
However, contra Nussbaum who considers that it is an ‘anti-social’ emotion
directed toward ourselves that prevents us from deciding whether an issue is
morally problematic, the moral disgust prompted by these artworks goes the
other way around, as an emotion aroused by a morally problematic situation
we recognise that both reminds us of our own mortality and contaminates our
social context. In this way, disturbatory feminist art focused on femicides,
on violence against females, elicits moral disgust not just because the artistic
vehicle in some cases can be disgusting, but because they show that what has
been done with the female’s bodies is morally disgusting and the situation is
contaminating many spheres of the social life.
For the same reason disturbatory artworks can also arouse sympathy. In
contrast to photographies that depict in the media the harm and suffering of
the other, the sympathy we are able to feel about the situations represented in
disturbatory art is not morally problematic, as Susan Sontag argued. For Son-
tag, photographies depicting suffering, specially photojournalism, can elicit
either ‘emotional anaesthesia’ (due to the repetitive exposure to these kinds
of images) or sympathy. And sympathy for her is an ‘impertinent’ emotion,
because it is a response due to the fact that we can feel safe from the harm
done to the other and we are not responsible for the situations depicted,
although it is possible to think about the other’s situation as if there is a
causal relation between my well-being and the other’s suffering.18 However,
the sympathy we can feel for the victims and her families in the disturbatory
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art examples given is not prompted by a recognition of either our own safety
or the relation our wealth may have with the other’s misery or suffering. Since
these artworks do not merely report an event, by showing the testimony of
the experience of the other they unveil the social, political, subjective and
bodily dimensions of the situations depicted, because they show how femi-
cides are gender crimes that contaminate and affect directly the people living
in those social contexts, and also how they may affect anyone as long as any
female can dissapear in the three senses given. Then, feeling for the other
sympathy by disturbatory artistic means makes possible a recognition of the
other’s vulnerability as well as our own.
Finally, disturbatory artworks that address femicides are able to elicit in-
dignation on the audience, as a moral emotion that ‘concerns harm or damage’
infringed upon females.19 As moral disgust, indignation can have a moral (and
political) effect: ‘to upset and unsettle comfortable attitudes and conceptual
frameworks’.20
Hanna Arendt pointed out that ‘the most intense feeling we know of, in-
tense to the point of blotting out all other experiences, namely, the experience
of great bodily pain, is at the same time the most private and least communi-
cable of all.’21 These artists are able to transform ‘the only experience which
we are unable to transform into a shape fit for public appearance’ into some-
thing that actually can be shown, can appear, through the artwork, since it is
capable of ‘making visible the invisible’ and shape materially our most shock-
ing individual and collective experiences.22 The use of artistic means in order
to show publicly female’s disappearances is a chance to expose indirectly the
voices of those females who were killed and silenced by social and institu-
tional contexts in which neither their deaths, pains, and even lives were ever
recognised, let alone the risks and fear all women in those contexts endure.
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NOTES
1. Danto 1990, 299.
2. Danto 2006, see URLs.
3. Danto 1990, 300.
4. Ibid.
5. Idem, 301.
6. Abjection appears as a rite of defilement
and pollution in the paganism that accom-
panies societies with a dominant or sur-
viving matrilineal character. It takes on
the form of the exclusion of substance (nu-
tritive or linked to sexuality), the execu-
tion of which coincides with the sacred
since it sets it up. Abjection persists as
exclusion or taboo (dietary or other) in
monotheistic religions, Judaism in partic-
ular, but drifts over to more ‘secondary’
forms such as transgression (of the Law)
within the same monotheistic economy. It
finally encounters, with Christian sin, a
dialectic elaboration, as it becomes inte-
grated in the Christian Word as a threat-
ening otherness—but always nameable, al-
ways totalisable. The various means of pu-
rifying the abject—the various catharses—
make up the history of religions, and end
up with that catharsis par excellence called
art, both on the far and near side of reli-
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gion. Seen from that standpoint, the artis-
tic experience, which is rooted in the ab-
ject it utters and by the same token puri-
fies, appears as the essential component of
religiosity’ Kristeva 1982, 17).
7. Danto, 2006, see URLs.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Danto 1990, 299.
11. Fontcuberta 2005, 68.
12. According to Diana Russell, a femicide is
‘the killing of females by males because
they are females’ (Russell 2011, see URLs).
In addition, Marcela Lagarde considers
femicides as the result of ‘the silence, omis-
sion, negligence, as well as the partial or
total collusion of authorities responsible
for the prevention and elimination of these
crimes’ (Lagarde y de los Ríos 2008, 216).
13. ‘A partir de reportes policíacos, utilicé
mi cuerpo como un mapa simbólico para
documentar y narrar la violencia en cin-
cuenta de los casos registrados. En un
ambiente de morgue, la pieza consistía
en reproducir en mi propio cuerpo, con
un plumón quirúrgico, cada uno de los
golpes, cortadas y balazos que dichas mu-
jeres sufrieron. De esta forma, mi cuerpo
se transformaba en un vehículo de repre-
sentación de la violencia hacia las mujeres
en Ciudad Juárez, hoy aparentemente in-
stitucionalizada.’ Wolffer, see URLs.
14. ‘Mi primer intención era validar la de-
saparición de mujeres, no de cifras; quería
ver las recámaras casi como un movimiento
intuitivo, como una necesidad pasada’. See
URLs.
15. Sontag 2003, 89.
16. Sontag 2003, 90.
17. Nussbaum 2004.
18. ‘The imaginary proximity to the suffering
inflicted on others that is granted by im-
ages suggests a link between the faraway
sufferers—seen close-up on the television
screen—and the privileged viewer that is
simply untrue, that is yet one more mysti-
fication of our real relations to power. So
far as we feel sympathy, we feel we are
not accomplices to what caused the suffer-
ing. To that extent, it can be (for all our
good intentions) an impertinent—if not an
inappropriate—response. To set aside the
sympathy we extend to others beset by war
and murderous politics for a reflection on
how our privileges are located on the same
map as their suffering, and may—in ways
we might prefer not to imagine—be linked
to their suffering, as the wealth of some
my imply the destitution of others, is a
task for which the painful, stirring images
supply only an initial spark.’ Sontag 2003,
80).
19. Nussbaum 2004, 102.
20. Korsmeyer 2011, 97.
21. Arendt 1998, 50-51.
22. Arendt 1998, 51.
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